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THIS IS AN INFO MATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

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DIST 7 FEBRUARY 1974

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1. JANUARY 1974,

ESTIMATES THAT


THE EXTREME LEFT IS COMPLETING ITS REORGANIZATIONAL PHASE AND

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WILL INITIATE HOSTILE ACTIVITIES DURING THE FIRST HALF OF MARCH.

AS EVIDENCE TO BACK THIS ESTIMATE. POINTS TO THE FACT

THAT ISOLATED ATTACKS ON ARMED FORCES AND CARABINERO PATROLS ARE

ALREADY TAKING PLACE, ALONG WITH ISOLATED CASES OF SABOTAGE.

OTHER INDICATIONS CITED AS PREPARING THE CLIMATE FOR TERRORIST


ACTIVITY INCLUDED HOSTILITY TOWARD THE PATROLS DURING THE CURFEW

HOURS AND CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY IN SUCH DIVERSE SECTORS AS

BUSINESS, HEALTH, INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORTATION.

- 2. NOTES THAT THE POSITION OF THE LEFT IS BEING STRENGTHENED BY SEVERAL FACTORS.
- A. THE NOTICEABLE DETERIGRATION OF THE IMAGE OF THE JUNTA GOVERNMENT AMONG THE LOW INCOME SECTORS AS A RESULT OF THE PRICE INCREASES ON ESSENTIAL MARTICLES AND THE GENERAL IMPATIENCE OF THE MASSES.
- B. UNNECESSARY USE OF EXCESSIVE EXERCISE OF AUTHORITY
 IN THE PROCESSES OF RESTORING ORDER IN THE COUNTRY, WHEN THE
 BASIC PREMISE SHOULD BE FIRM, BUT JUST.
 - C. THE ARRIVAL OF FOREIGNERS, PARTICULARLY ARGENTINES,
 AT THE SUMMER BEACH RESORTS, WHICH HAS GIVEN THE COMMUNIST
 YOUTH THE OPPORTUNITY TO FORTIFY THEIR ACTIVITY AND TO INCREASE

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


THEIR CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT BY WORD OF MOUTH AND BY THE DISSEMINATION OF PAMPHELTS AND FLYERS.

- D. IMPROVEMENT IN THE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM BETHEEN CHILEAN RESISTANCE GROUPS IN ARGENTINA AND LEFTIST LEADERS OPERATING IN CLANDESTINITY IN CHILE.
- E. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO INDICATE A SLOW RETURN TO CHILE OF ACTIVISTS FROM ARGENTINA, ESTIMATED AT NO LESS THAN 10,000, MOST OF WHOM ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE PROVINCES OF ACONCAGUA AND BIO-BIO. THESE NUMBERS CAN INCREASE IN DIRECT PROPORTION TO THE SUCCESS OF THEIR INITIAL OPERATIONS.
- FORCES AND CARABINEROS WHICH ARE ASSISTING THE CAUSE OF THE LEFT:
- A. DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE ENLISTED MEN WITH THEIR ECONOMIC SITUATION.
- B. DECLINE IN THE LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY AS A
 RESULT OF THE TRANSFER TO POSITIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT OF COMMANDERS
 WITH EXPERIENCE AND INFLUENCE OVER THEIR TROOPS, AND THEIR
 REPLACEMENT WITH LESSER-EXPERIENCED OFFICERS. THIS HAS HAD
 A PARTICULARLY NEGATIVE EFFECT ON THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES,
 WHICH REQUIRE CONTINUITY TO ACHIEVE EFFICIENCY.







INTERNAL SUBVERSION IS DECIDEDLY ON THE INCREASE AND THAT THE 1.5 (C)

ARMED FORCES AND CARABINEROS DO NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONTAIN

URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE PRINCIPAL CITIES OF THE COUNTRY.

THERE IS GENERAL RESENTMENT IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AS

A RESULT OF THEIR INEFFICIENCY DUE TO SHORTAGES OF PERSONNEL,

MATERIEL, ORGANIZATION AND CENTRAL GUIDANCE. THE COUNTRY IS

IN A STATE OF INTERNAL WAR, BUT THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY

IS NOT BEING MAINTAINED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUCH A SITUATION.

THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA ARE NOT RESPONDING TO THE MINIMUM

REQUIREMENTS OF WARTIME. THERE IS A DETERIORATION IN THE DISCIPLINE,

- PROPOSES THAT THE JUNTA PUT INTO EFFECT THE FOLLOWING MEASURES WHICH CORRESPOND TO THE STATE OF WAR WHICH THE COUNTRY IS EXPERIENCING:
- A. SUBORDINATE THE ACTIONS OF THE MINISTRIES TO THE ANTI-SUBVERSIVE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE COMMANDER OF THE JURIS-DICTIONAL AREA FOR INTERNAL SECURITY (CAJSI).

MORAL AND ESPIRIT DE CORPS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND CARABINEROS.

B. CENTRALIZE THE INTELLIGENCE GATHERING EFFORTS UNDER
THE DIRECTION, ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL

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DEFENSE.

- C. INCREASE THE MILITARY AND POLICE STRENGTH TO MEET THE PRESENT DEMANDS.
 - D. PLACE THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA UNDER MILITARY CONTROL.
 - E. IMPROVE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF THE ARMED FORCES.
- F. EMPHASIZE ECONOMIC MEASURES WHICH FAVOR THE LOWER INCOME SECTORS, WHICH WILL RESULT IN SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA.

